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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, Attorney General Avrum Gross banned plea bargaining
in Alaska.' Although few thought that the policy would still be in
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1. In his original ban, Attorney General Gross used the term "plea bargaining"
to include both sentence bargaining and charge bargaining. A sentence bargain is an
arrangement in which the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere in exchange for
a specific sentence agreed to by the prosecutor, who then recommends it to the judge.
A charge bargain is an arrangement in which the prosecutor agrees to reduce the
original charge or dismiss one or more charges in exchange for the defendant's plea of
guilty or nolo contendere. Plea bargaining in general is governed by Alaska Rule of
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effect fifteen years later, the Alaska Judicial Council's most recent
evaluation of the ban2 shows that it continues to affect virtually every
important aspect of Alaska's criminal justice system.
Attorney General Gross enunciated several purposes for his deci-
sion to ban plea bargaining, including both the establishment of a sys-
tem that could fairly charge, try and sentence defendants and the
restoration of public confidence in the justice system.3 The attorney
general also believed that the number of cases going to trial would
increase as a result of the ban, that such an increase in trials would
improve the skills of his prosecutorial staff.4 Nevertheless, the an-
nouncement met with some shock and stiff resistance from the legal
community, including most prosecutors.
Although the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals had, in 1973, called for the abolition of plea bar-
gaining in all states by 1978, 5 most experts considered such a ban im-
possible, undesirable or both.6 Many attorneys and scholars predicted
that banning plea bargaining would result in a flood of defendants ex-
ercising their right to trial, jamming the courts and creating huge
backlogs.7 Others suggested that it would be impossible to truly ban
plea bargaining because it would simply be forced underground or
Criminal Procedure 11(e). This article uses the terms plea, sentence and charge bar-
gaining in the same way that the attorney general used them.
2. The Alaska Judicial Council first evaluated the ban on plea bargaining in 1978
in a project funded by the National Institute of Justice. The report on the project's
findings was initially published as M. RUBINSTEIN, T. WHITE & S. CLARKE, THE
EFFECT OF THE OFFICIAL PROHIBITION OF PLEA BARGAINING ON THE DISPOSITION
OF FELONY CASES IN THE ALASKA CRIMINAL COURTS (1978). The report was re-
published by the United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice as
,M. RUBINSTEIN, T. WHITE & S. CLARKE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING (1980)
[hereinafter ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING]. The Council's most recent evalua-
tion, funded by the State Justice Institute, was published in January 1991 as T. CARNS
& J. KRUSE, ALASKA'S PLEA BARGAINING BAN RE-EVALUATED (1991) [hereinafter
THE BAN RE-EVALUATED].
3. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 14.
4. Id. at 15-16; see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, COURTS 50 (1973).
6. See Hermann, Adapting to Plea Bargaining: Prosecutors, in CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: LAW AND POLITICS 153 (G. Cole 4th ed. 1984); Brunk, The Problem of Volun-
tariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 524 (Winter
1979); Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 509 (Winter
1979).
7. See J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS 2-23 to 2-25 (1983);
People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 196, 162 N.W.2d 777, 782 (1968) (Levin, J.,
concurring); U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, supra note 5, at 45.
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changed in nature." Still other attorneys argued that plea bargaining
was a just and rational way to resolve cases because it enabled the
parties with the best knowledge of the case, the prosecutor and defense
attorney, to decide the outcome. 9
From 1975 to 1988, the social, economic and demographic char-
acteristics of Alaska's criminal justice system changed significantly.
In the face of a new criminal code, 10 new provisions for presumptive
sentencing" and a drastically altered state economy, 12 it was unclear
whether the ban persisted and evolved or decayed. In 1988, the State
Justice Institute provided funding for the Alaska Judicial Council to
conduct a re-evaluation of the ban on plea bargaining. The study as-
sessed the evidence for continued existence of the ban, analyzed the
interaction of the ban with presumptive sentencing and the revised
criminal code, and reviewed other demographic and economic factors
that helped reshape Alaska's criminal justice system.
The Judicial Council's re-evaluation concluded that the original
ban caused substantial decreases in bothosentence and charge bargain-
ing. Comparing the situation fifteen years ago to the situation today,
8. W. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL IsSUES AND COMMON PRAC-
TICEs 26 (1986); see also Cohen & Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and Their Impacts, in 2
RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 316 (1983).
9. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 242.
10. The revised criminal code was adopted in 1978. Act effective Jan. 1, 1980, ch.
166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 1-120. For an overview of the Criminal Code Revision
Commission and its work, see Stem, The Proposed Alaska Revised Criminal Code, 7
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1977). The new code revised all common offenses ex-
cept drugs, which were re-codified in 1982. Act effective Jan. 1, 1983, ch. 45, 1982
Alaska Sess. Laws 1-55.
11. Presumptive sentencing for all repeat offenders and first felony offenders con-
victed of violent crimes involving firearms or serious physical injury was adopted in
1978 at the same time as the criminal code revision. Act effective Jan. 1, 1980, ch.
166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 100-16. The presumptive sentencing scheme was revised
by the legislature in 1982 to include all first felony offenders convicted of Class A
offenses. Act effective Oct. 1, 1982, ch. 143, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 24-25. In 1983,
the scheme was further amended to include the unclassified offenses of first degree
sexual assault and first degree sexual abuse of a minor. Act effective Oct. 17, 1983, ch.
78, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 5. See generally Stem, Presumptive Sentencing in Alaska,
2 ALASKA L. REv. 227 (1985).
12. The state's economy has cycled through two boom-bust periods since 1975.
During construction of the Alaska pipeline for transport of oil from the North Slope,
the economy benefited from increasing population and substantial construction
money. That period started in 1974 and ended in 1978. The economy was relatively
weak from 1978 until 1981, when oil prices increased worldwide and the state's reve-
nues soared. Population and construction again increased rapidly until late 1985-early
1986. Oil prices then dropped suddenly. The economic upturns contributed substan-
tial resources for increased law enforcement and justice system agencies, while the
downturns caused limits on justice system funding and were used to argue for in-
creased plea bargaining. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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the report found that the ban remains the official policy, albeit some-
what modified, of the attorney general's office.13 In prosecutors' of-
fices, the ban has caused increased attention to the screening and
charging decisions for the acceptance of cases. The standard shifted
from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt. Charge bargaining
became fairly common in most parts of the state during the latter half
of the 1980s, although sentence bargaining remained infrequent. Fi-
nally, the report found that over the past fifteen years the percentage
of convicted offenders sentenced to jail time increased substantially,
and the mean active sentence length for those sentenced to jail
lengthened. 14
This article summarizes the data and conclusions found in the
Judicial Council's re-evaluation report, and elaborates on its recom-
mendations. The article begins with a brief description of the history
of the ban, including an analysis of its evolution over the last fifteen
years. It then looks at the report's statistical and interview findings,' 5
and the Council's recommendations on the key issues of screening,
charge reductions and dismissals, trials and the interaction of the ban
with presumptive sentencing.
13. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 1.
14. Id. The report further concluded that these trends probably resulted as much
from increased societal concerns about crime as from presumptive sentencing and the
ban on plea bargaining. Id.
15. The statistical analyses reported here relied on data taken from the state's
PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management and Information System) database, supple-
mented with data from the Alaska Department of Public Safety's APSIN system (on
prior criminal history and race) and the Department of Corrections' OBSCIS system
(presumptive sentence and race verification). The information from the three
databases was merged into a single file which was then analyzed on the University of
Alaska-Anchorage's VAX, using SPSSX for the majority of the analyses.
The second major component of the re-evaluation of the ban was a series of inter-
views conducted with experienced attorneys, judges, police, defendants and correc-
tions personnel. The interviews were conducted in several distinct groups. The first
set of interviews included 27 attorneys and judges, approximately 35 police officers
and 10 probation and parole officers, all of whom had handled criminal cases from
1975 or earlier through at least 1983. These interviews were partially structured and
usually lasted one to two hours. The second set of interviews included about 100
judges and attorneys who were currently handling criminal cases. All had at least one
year's experience, and most had substantially more. This group includes a few of the
attorneys who had been interviewed earlier. The interviews were somewhat more
structured and took about an hour each. Both sets of interviews included attorneys
from a variety of communities; the second set covered all of the major rural areas as
well as Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau. The attorneys in both sets included prose-
cutors, public defense attorneys and private attorneys experienced in criminal cases.
Judges were drawn from both the trial and appellate courts. Twenty-nine interviews
were conducted with defendants. See infra note 170.
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II. HISTORY OF THE BAN
A. Plea Bargaining Practices: Pre-1975
Before the ban, prosecutors typically ified charges with the court
without first screening16 the allegations brought to them by the police.
In fact, most charges were either fied by the police officer, or the pros-
ecutor filed charges identical to those recommended by the police.' 7
The lack of standards for accepting cases meant there was little consis-
tency in screening decisions among prosecutors.18 The practical result
was that the police could make arrests and bring charges with a mini-
mum of investigation. These cases often suffered from evidentiary
problems, making a plea bargain an attractive alternative to trial for
the prosecutors.'9
Before the ban on plea bargaining, policies regarding plea negoti-
ations were established in each local office, often by individual prose-
cutors.20 Most criminal cases were negotiated under Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1 l(e).21 Attorneys throughout the state described
the former criminal case disposition process in much the same terms
in the Judicial Council's 1978 evaluation of the ban: "[N]egotiating
was almost mandatory. We had so few trials we were afraid of
16. "Screening," as the term is used in this article and the original plea bargaining
report, refers to the prosecutor's decision whether to file a complaint against a suspect
between the time that the police officer makes allegations and the time of the suspect's
first court appearance. As a practical matter, this process generally includes evaluat-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence, the legal accuracy of the proposed police charges
and other criteria, including whether the interests of justice would be served by prose-
cution and whether the prosecutor has sufficient resources to pursue the case. In
Alaska, a person who is arrested must be brought before a judge or magistrate within
twenty-four hours of his arrest, including Sundays and holidays. ALASKA R. CRIM.
P. 5(a)(1). If there is no complaint in the file at the first court appearance, or arraign-
ment, the judge will dismiss the case.
The term "screening" may be expanded to include all activity in a case prior to
indictment by a grand jury. However, the whole set of proceedings occurring during
the early phase of case processing, from screening up to indictment, is often referred to
as "intake" by prosecutors and defense attorneys.
17. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 41.
18. Id.
19. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 16.
20. Id. at 45-49.
21. Id. at 1-2. Under Criminal Rule 11(e),
[t]he attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant may engage in
discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the enter-
ing of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or
related offense, the attorney for the state will move for dismissal of other
charges, or will recommend or not oppose the imposition of a particular
sentence, or will do both.
ALASKA R. GRIM. P. 11(e)(1). The court may either accept or reject the plea agree-
ment. However, if the court rejects the agreement, the defendant has the opportunity
to withdraw his plea. Id. R. 1 1(e)(3)-(4).
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them."' 22 Attorneys also agreed that while most judges were not di-
rectly involved in plea negotiations, some did indicate their approval
of an arrangement prior to the actual entry of the plea.23
The focus of plea negotiations was on the sentence.24 Prosecutors
and defense attorneys typically agreed on the specific sentence that a
defendant should serve, and their recommendation was nearly always
accepted by the judge.25
Assistant district attorneys tended to be young and inexperienced,
and most offices had a fairly high turnover rate. Because few cases
were tried, assistant district attorneys did not gain much trial
experience. 26
B. Implementation of the Ban
The attorney general announced on July 3, 1975 that his new pol-
icy prohibiting plea bargaining in most cases would take effect on Au-
gust 15, 1975. Included in the prohibition were all recommendations
for specific sentences, and charge reductions done solely to obtain a
guilty plea.27 Exceptions to the policy were allowed only with the per-
mission of the attorney general's central office in Juneau. In 1980,
Attorney General Wilson Condon relaxed this policy to permit the
head of each local district attorney's office to authorize bargains. 28
Because of the degree of centralization in Alaska's criminal jus-
tice system, 29 the state's attorney general was able to prohibit plea bar-
gaining by all state prosecutors through a simple intra-office edict. No
22. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 11.
23. Id. at 6-7.
24. Attorney General Gross described the existing practices: "Presently, after the
initial complaint is filed, negotiations take place with defense counsel over the appro-
priateness of the charge, continued conferences take place, and eventually as a result
of either preliminary proceedings or continuous negotiation, some agreement is
reached on sentence." Memorandum from Alaska Attorney General Avrum Gross to
Alaska District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys 4 (July 24, 1975) [herein-
after Gross Memorandum], reprinted in THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at
A-4; see also ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 4.
25. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 6.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Gross Memorandum, supra note 24, at 3-4.
28. ALASKA DEP'T OF LAW, CRIM. DIV., STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO CASE
SCREENING AND PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 24-25 (June 1, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 STAN-
DARDS], reprinted in THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at A-13 to A-27.
29. Alaska's criminal justice system is characterized by highly-centralized, state-
financed justice agencies. The Department of Law is headed by the attorney general,
who is appointed by the governor. All of the state's district attorneys and assistant
district attorneys are employed by the Department of Law. All courts are part of the
state court system; there are no local or county courts. The Department of Correc-
tions controls most of the state's correctional facilities. The state pays all jail and
prison costs with the exception of a few local jails in rural towns and villages, which
[Vol. 8:27
PLEA BARGAINING BAN
change in statutes or court rules or cooperation from other agencies
was necessary for his policy to take effect.
C. Immediate Effects of the Ban on Plea Bargaining: 1975-79
The Alaska Judicial Council's first evaluation of the effectiveness
of the policy prohibiting plea bargaining found that plea bargaining as
an institution was substantially curtailed.30 The ban eliminated most
sentence recommendations. Charge bargaining persisted informally,
but the opportunities were greatly attenuated, except in rural areas.
31
Trial rates, which more than doubled in the two years after the ban,
peaked in 1977 and dropped off slightly in 1978 and 1979, suggesting
less rigid enforcement of the ban.32 For about a year after the ban,
some judges took a more active role in plea negotiations,33 perhaps in
an effort to obtain a fairer result. This practice halted after the Alaska
Supreme Court decided in two separate cases that judges should not
participate in plea discussions.34
Critics of the policy suggested then, as now, that despite its offi-
cial status the policy was never enforced.35 A few defense attorneys
said that the policy did not inhibit their access to negotiated pleas.
36
Others have suggested that because the data showed little substantial
change in reductions and dismissals of charges in the first year after
the ban, there is no proof that plea bargaining ever stopped.37 To at
least some observers, the fact that sentences imposed after pleas of
guilty or nolo contendere tend to be shorter than those imposed after
conviction at trial is another indication of continuing plea
bargaining.38
are paid for by contracts with the state Department of Public Safety. Indigent defend-
ants are represented by the state public defender. If a conflict arises within the Public
Defender Agency, most affected clients are represented by another state agency, the
Office of Public Advocacy.
30. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 31.
31. For purposes of this study, rural areas of the state were defined as those com-
munities with a single superior court (court of general jurisdiction) judge. In most
such courts, the judge was assisted by a law-trained magistrate who handled most
misdemeanors. These courts include Barrow, Bethel, Kenai, Ketchikan, Kodiak,
Kotzebue, Nome, Palmer, Sitka and Valdez.
32. N. MAROULES & T. WHITE, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1976-1979, at 14-
15 (1980).
33. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 111.
34. Buckalew v. State, 561 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1977); Carlson v. State, 555 P.2d 269
(Alaska 1976).
35. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 9, 13-17.
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 24.
38. W. McDONALD, supra note 8, at 6.
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Attorney General Gross emphasized the need to increase
prosecutorial screening of police charges, both to prevent overcharg-
ing and to keep prosecutors' caseloads manageable. 39 Screening of
charges fied by the police was a crucial element of the new policy.
Since police throughout the state had been accustomed to making
charging decisions, this aspect of the policy was controversial. In
Anchorage, for example, according to a former police officer, the new
screening procedures led to a "tough two years in the relationship be-
tween police and the district attorney."4° The adoption of a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard for screening cases "forced [the police] to
go back and become good investigators .... ,,41 Screening standards
were also tightened in other communities, but did not create the same
degree of anxdety as in Anchorage.
The ban was not implemented uniformly throughout the state.
The "local legal culture"42 shaped the contours of the policy in each
area. In Southeast Alaska,43 for example, trial rates did not increase
as much as in Anchorage or Fairbanks,4 although attorneys agreed
that the policy was faithfully implemented. The legal community of
Southeast Alaska had always been fairly collegial and remained so af-
ter the ban. In Fairbanks, by contrast, where the atmosphere had been
adversarial prior to the ban,45 the trial rate, already the highest in the
state, increased substantially. Anchorage trial rates also increased. 46
Case outcomes changed in two important ways after the ban.
First, case disposition times dropped, rather than increased, as had
been almost universally expected.47 Second, sentence lengths in-
creased.48 In the first year after the ban, the primary increase in sen-
tence length that could be statistically linked to the ban was for
relatively low-risk offenders, those with minimal prior records con-
victed of non-violent offenses. 49 In the second year after the ban,
39. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 35-36.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id.
42. The term "local legal culture" is found in T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE &
T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54
(1978) [hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED]. The original 1978 study of the plea bargain-
ing ban concluded that "situs of prosecution had stronger associations with differences
in the outcomes of court dispositions than whether or not those dispositions were
subject to the policy against plea bargaining." ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING,
supra note 2, at iii; see also JUSTICE DELAYED, supra at 235-41.
43. Southeast Alaska includes Juneau, Sitka and Ketchikan.
44. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 279-80 (Table V-1).
45. Id. at 45.
46. Id. at 279-80 (Table V-i).
47. Id. at 119-21.
48. Id. at 293-94 (Table VII-1).
49. Id. at 303 (Table VII-5).
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sentences for violent offenders more than doubled, sentences for prop-
erty offenders doubled and sentences for fraud offenses rose substan-
tially.50 At least some of this change can be attributed to the
prohibition on plea bargaining.
D. Changes in the Status of the Plea Bargaining Ban: 1980-90
The Alaska Attorney General still maintains an official policy
prohibiting plea bargaining in most situations. However, attorneys
who practiced in Alaska prior to the ban and continue to do so gener-
ally do not believe the current system resembles the 1975 system.5 1
Factors that caused the policy to change over the years include official
changes promulgated by attorneys general who succeeded Avrum
Gross, as well as incremental modifications that came about as local
district attorneys were given progressively more discretion in imple-
menting the policy without frequently consulting the central office in
Juneau.
Perhaps the most interesting effect of these changes is that a con-
tinuum of perceptions of the policy still exists, ranging from those who
profess ignorance of any prohibitions on plea bargaining 2 to those
who contend that exceptions to the policy are rare and that most pleas
occur without specific agreed-upon concessions from the prosecutor.5 3
The most general understanding of the policy, even among many pros-
ecutors, is that sentence bargains are prohibited absent special circum-
stances, but that charge bargaining is allowed.54
The first important modification of the ban occurred in 1980.
Gross' successor, Attorney General Wilson Condon issued guidelines
permitting a wider range of charge reductions and dismissals.5 5 The
guidelines reiterated the general policy of the Department of Law that
prosecuting attorneys for the State of Alaska will not engage in the
practice of plea bargaining.5 6 The guidelines, however, allowed the
50. N. MAROULES & T. WHITE, supra note 32, at 20.
51. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 17-18.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 17. Gross commented in 1988 that he had not expected the ban to
remain as inflexible as it had been during the first few years. He noted that it was rigid
in the beginning to prevent attorneys from getting "through the loopholes," but that
its experimental nature guaranteed that the policy would change over time. Id.
55. 1980 STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 24.
56. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 19. Plea bargaining was defined
as:
a process which involves discussions between the prosecution and the de-
fendant or his attorney, if he is represented, that are designed to arrive at an
agreement under which the defendant will waive his right to trial and enter a
plea of guilty to one or more charges in exchange for some concession from
the prosecution usually in the form of a reduced charge, a reduced number
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defendant to plead, in cases not including offenses involving violence
against a person, "to one or more counts included in the charging in-
strument which includes at'least the major charge, if any, and which
represents a plea to the 'essence' of the conduct engaged in and repre-
sented in the original charging document .... -"57 The guidelines also
noted that "information pertaining to the additional count or counts
may be fully related to the court at sentencing. '58
Condon's 1980 guidelines were described as "a major change"
that "allowed some negotiation if the defendant pled to the essence of
the crime committed. '59 A long-time attorney noted that at the time
these guidelines were issued, the central office in Juneau was "easing
up on ... control of all bargains." 6° It was no longer necessary to
"consult with upstairs" on every case.61 This attorney's theme was
common among long-time lawyers: as the prosecutors' offices became
more professional, thus satisfying one of the goals of the ban, more
trust was placed in local offices. Turnover rates among prosecutors
were lower as well, which encouraged the decentralization of
authority.
The second important modification of the ban occurred in late
1986, when Attorney General Harold Brown issued a memorandum
permitting sentence recommendations in cases where the sentence af-
ter trial was reasonably predictable.62 One district attorney believed
of charges and/or a particular sentence recommendation or agreement not
to oppose a defense recommendation at sentencing.
Id. Although the written directives were carefully phrased to emphasize the policy of
no plea negotiations, these changes were inevitably perceived as allowing some types
of plea bargaining.
57. Id. at 24. Condon's guidelines required the prosecutor to obtain specific ap-
proval from the supervising attorney (usually the district attorney in charge of a local
office) before dismissing the remaining counts. Id. at 25.
58. Id. This option became an item of negotiation between prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys, as did discussions of whether to file aggravating and mitigating factors
in presumptive sentencing cases, recommendations about probation conditions, and
other factors related to the sentence. Id. at 157.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The memorandum stated:
Part II-C. of the Standards is modified to allow each office, through the su-
pervising attorney or the intake attorney if one is designated, to make spe-
cific sentencing recommendations or to agree to not oppose a
recommendation. This authority may be exercised in cases involving non-
presumptive sentences when, based on experience and professional judg-
ment, the specific sentence being recommended would be reasonably foresee-
able after a trial. This authority may also be exercised in cases involving
presumptive sentences when an analysis of cases involving similar facts, in-
cluding aggravating or mitigating factors and published or unpublished ap-
pellate decisions, provide specific guidance as to an appropriate sentence.
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this new provision was intended "to allow for plea bargaining without
taking the political heat."' 63 Another described the new modification
more eloquently, saying that specific recommendations were not
meant to bind the courts, but to lead them "to an area of a proper
sentence, rather than having the attorney provide the sentence for
them.""
These two sets of formal changes to the policy, combined with the
revision of the criminal code and the implementation of presumptive
sentencing in 1978, created an environment conducive to widespread
charge bargaining. In 1989, one assistant district attorney said that,
while the ban was officially absolute, charge bargaining was acceptable
in practice.65 Another prosecutor noted that the formal ban had de-
cayed since 1985 to become a ban "in name only." 66 An assistant pub-
lie defender agreed that adherence to the ban relaxed in 1986. He
attributed the change to a new awareness of the costs of prosecuting
and imprisoning offenders sentenced to long presumptive terms. 67
Another attorney who had practiced in Alaska since the early
1970s said: "The ban does not drive the system the way it used to."'68
This is evidenced by the fact that budget documents prepared by crim-
inal justice agencies for the legislature in the 1980s used arguments
other than the ban to justify their needs for additional staff.69 Pre-
sumptive sentencing, a new criminal code and substantial changes in
the state's population and economy replaced the plea bargaining pol-
icy as persuasive arguments for budgetary adjustments.
Non-trial dispositions in unclassified and class A felony cases require the
approval of the Central Office unless they are governed by an exception in
the Standards that existed prior to this modification.
Memorandum from Attorney General Harold M. Brown to All District Attorney Of-
fices 1-2 (Nov. 26, 1986), reprinted in THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at A-
28 to A-29.
63. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 20.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 17.
69. One example is that budget documents prepared by the Department of Law
for fiscal year 1987 (July 1986 through June 1987) emphasized the state's increasing
population, the increased number of child sexual abuse cases, and the increased
number of drug cases as reasons for funding new prosecutors and associated staff. The
ban was not mentioned. Budget Request from Alaska Dep't of Law, Crim. Div., to
Alaska Legislature (June 11, 1985). In the 1970s, by contrast, the ban had been used
as an argument in favor of increased budgets for the state judicial system. A former
Anchorage district attorney noted, "the ban was great as far as a budget because I
could moan and groan about the burden of the ban and the legislature would listen."
THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 97.
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
The Alaska Judicial Council's 1978 report evaluating the ban on
plea bargaining concluded that:
[P]lea bargaining as an institution was clearly curtailed. The rou-
tine expectation of a negotiated settlement was removed; for most
practitioners justifiable reliance on negotiation to settle criminal
cases greatly diminished in importance. There is less face-to-face
discussion between adversaries, and when meetings do occur, they
are not usually as productive as they used to be.70
By 1989, however, Anchorage prosecutors were describing the routine
"pre-indictment" hearings7 1 as opportunities for charge bargaining in
most cases. One prosecutor noted that charge bargaining was com-
monplace.72 Still, there was little bargaining after the intake phase of
case processing. 73
Although other areas of the state were not using pre-indictment
hearing procedures to negotiate charges in 1989, attorneys still bar-
gained their cases. An assistant prosecutor in one of the smaller com-
munities said that he had heard about the ban before coming to Alaska
two years earlier and was surprised to find as much plea bargaining in
his new community as he had engaged in outside the state. He added
that he thought the ban was enforced more in Anchorage than else-
where in the state.74 Another attorney commented that the ban was a
tool in the prosecutors' arsenal: "I don't recall being encumbered by
the ban [after 1980]. The ban was a device, like those used by car
salesmen: 'I'll have to ask the manager.' Charge bargaining was
commonplace. '75
These comments strongly suggest that the policy has decayed,
particularly in the last five years. Although some attorneys paid rela-
tively little attention to the attorney general's policy in their practices,
70. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 31 (emphasis in original).
71. Pre-indictment hearings are a case management tool used by the Anchorage
district attorney's office to review most felony cases. There are no formal court rules
governing the hearings. The prosecutor in charge of these hearings has described them
as a means of "stopping the clock" on Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 5, which
requires that the defendant be indicted by a grand jury or receive a preliminary hear-
ing within ten clays of arrest. This allows prosecutors to obtain more information
about the case before seeking an indictment. Defense attorneys meet with the prose-
cutors shortly before the pre-indictment hearings to negotiate and discuss cases. A
prosecutor noted that generally, if the defendant is offered a disposition short of trial,
it must be accepted at this time.
72. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 24.
73. Id. "Intake" refers to the prosecutorial decisions about charging that occur
early in case processing. In most parts of the state, intake includes all prosecutorial
decisions from the time the case is referred to the prosecutor's office until the filing of
an indictment or information.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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a prohibition on plea bargaining did exist for many others. The prohi-
bition applied most strongly to sentence bargaining. More often than
not, cases went to "open sentencing," at which both the defense attor-
ney and prosecutor presented arguments and recommendations, with
the prosecutor stopping short of recommending a specific term of
years. The formal plea bargains that were made seemed to be reserved
for cases that traditionally would have been bargained even under the
policy at its strictest: sexual abuse or sexual assault cases, drug cases
and cases involving informants. 76
The evidence from the interviews also unequivocally suggests that
prosecutors regularly engaged in charge bargaining, although most of
these bargains were never formalized under Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11.77 Attorneys appeared to interpret this rule to require
notice to the court of an agreement only if the prosecutor recom-
mended a specific sentence.78 Some attorneys viewed the charge bar-
gaining that occurred as consistent with the existing attorney general's
guidelines; others believed that the situation was inconsistent with the
policy but that bargaining was necessary or justified. 79
A manual for defense attorneys prepared in 1989 for the Alaska
Bar Association's Continuing Legal Education program sheds further
light on current practices.80 The manual notes that in Anchorage, fel-
ony charge bargaining with the state is fairly common, while sentence
bargaining is much less frequent.81 The manual also describes prac-
tices in other parts of the state. For example, although plea negotia-
tions are not discussed in the pointers given for Juneau and the Second
Judicial District,8 2 the manual notes that charge bargaining is com-
mon in Fairbanks, but sentence bargaining is not.8 3
Interviews indicate that differences in enforcing the ban depend-
ing upon the area of the state are common knowledge. A district at-
torney in Palmer said that he did not think the ban was a clear one,
but merely that plea bargaining was "frowned on to some degree."
84
76. Id. at 25.
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. S. ORLANSKY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1989). The manual commented that
plea bargaining by Anchorage municipal prosecutors was standard practice. Munici-
pal prosecutors, who handle only misdemeanors, are hired by the municipality of
Anchorage and therefore are not subject to the state's ban on plea bargaining. Id. at 7.
81. Id.
82. The Second Judicial District includes the Barrow, Nome and Kotzebue
courts.
83. S. ORLANSKY, supra note 80, at Fourth Judicial District (Fairbanks) Practice
appendix.
84. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 14.
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A public defender in Fairbanks perceived a much stricter policy, say-
ing that there was "appreciably less negotiation in Fairbanks than in
other parts of the state."'85
Although conventional wisdom held that the ban never was in-
tended for the rural areas of the state, and that no one in the Bush
followed it, a fairly large number of the attorneys actually working in
Bush communities believed that the ban fully applied to them. In
Bethel, a public defender noted that the local prosecutors were "very
careful not to show an appearance of plea bargaining. '8 6 Because he
had worked in other communities, he added that in those areas, the
"sensitivity to the prohibition that there is in Bethel" was not always
present. 87
Attorneys were asked to speculate about what might happen if
the ban were eliminated. Although some said that nothing would
change, the majority thought the system would change in various
ways. Fewer trials, less care taken in police work, less diligent prose-
cutors, and greater efficiency in the criminal justice system were all
seen as possible results of eliminating the ban. Even attorneys who
said that the ban was merely pro forma responded to the question
about its elinination by citing potential changes. 88 Some believed
there would be less uniformity in the treatment of defendants.8 9
Others thought that elimination of the ban would result in a smaller
prison population, fewer trials, and a less-costly justice system.90
Whether the evidence is interpreted as supporting the proposition
that the ban has evolved into a stable policy structuring the entry of
pleas with relatively little of the bargaining that occurs in other juris-
dictions, or as a decay of the policy into a shell maintained for public
relations purposes, it was clear that the situation in Alaska in 1990
was not the same as it was in 1975. In 1975, sentence bargaining was
the preferred mode of disposition of cases. 91 By 1990, a guilty or nolo
contendere plea with a bargained charge or charges appeared to be the
most likely disposition of a case.92 While police played a major role in
determining the charge to be filed in 1975, prosecutors are currently
primarily responsible for charging decisions. Prior to 1975, turnover
was high among prosecutors and few had significant trial experience.
By 1990, the prosecutors' offices were considered generally profes-
sional and experienced at trials.
85. Id. at 14-15.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id.
91. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 1-12.
92. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 26.
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III. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BAN ON PLEA BARGAINING
The re-evaluation concluded that the ban on plea bargaining had
several important long-term effects that were either agreed upon by
most attorneys, judges and police officers, or suggested by phenomena
that could be measured statistically.93 Pre-filing screening of cases by
prosecutors led to new standards for police investigations, resulting in
increased police professionalism. Sentence recommendations were ini-
tially severely curtailed, and were uncommon in 1990. Charge bar-
gaining, which had been secondary to sentence recommendations as
the mode of negotiation prior to the ban, was infrequent for a period of
time after the ban, but became more important as a means of case
disposition during the 1980s. 94
The re-evaluation of the ban concluded that the policy had effects
on four major aspects of criminal justice case processing: screening
and intake of cases by prosecutors, charge reductions and dismissals,
trials, and sentencing practices. This section describes the re-evalua-
tion's findings in three of these four areas of interest; sentencing is
described in section IV below.
A. Screening
Because the range of possible sanctions against the defendant is
dependent on the charges, the screening decisions affect all of the sub-
sequent actions in a case.95 The attorney general saw screening of
cases as the key to making the prohibition of plea bargaining work.
He believed there would be substantially less impetus to reduce or dis-
miss charges later if the prosecutors chose a provable charge at the
beginning of the case.96 In fact, interview and statistical data confirm
that a more rigorous screening policy was implemented with the ban,
93. The statistical analyses reported in the re-evaluation relied on a database
taken from the state's PROMIS system. See supra note 15. The database included all
felony charges referred to the Department of Law during 1984-87, and data for 1974-
76 cases originally reported in the Alaska Judicial Council's 1978 evaluation of the
ban on plea bargaining.
The database from the 1978 evaluation included all felony arrests from
Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau that occurred between August 16, 1974 and Au-
gust 14, 1976. In the 1978 evaluation, each individual charge constituted a unit of
analysis. In the present re-evaluation, for both the 1974-76 and the 1984-87 database,
a single case was the unit of analysis. The case was identified by the single most
serious charge against the defendant, and, if the defendant was convicted, the single
most serious charge of conviction. See THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at B-
1 to B-9. Because the entire universe of cases handled by prosecutors' offices was
represented in the database, statistical methods appropriate to samples generally were
not useful.
94. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 31-35.
95. For a definition of screening see supra note 16.
96. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 35.
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and that this new screening policy generally took the charging decision
away from the police and put it into the hands of the prosecutor.9
7
This screening policy also encouraged police officers to improve the
quality of their investigations. 98
The new screening policy adopted a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for accepting cases. 99 The policy was implemented vigor-
ously in Anchorage and Fairbanks, and adopted in most other parts of
the state. The changes brought about by more rigorous screening were
among the most significant and long-lasting effects of the ban. Prior to
the ban, only about 8% of the arrested or referred cases brought by
the police in Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau were screened out (Ta-
ble 1). During the first year after the ban, a small but significant in-
crease to 11% occurred. Between 1984 and 1987, about 30% of cases
were screened out (Table 1).100
Attorneys and police officers interviewed agreed that the initial
increase in the number of cases screened out was bought at a high
price. Because the officers had customarily perceived themselves as
making the charging decision, the attorney general's policy of claiming
this function for prosecutors left them angry. They were concerned
that criminals were not being prosecuted and that victims were not
receiving redress. In the longer run, however, police opinion grew
more positive. A veteran police officer described the effects of the pol-
icy on the Anchorage Police Department, saying that police work
prior to 1975 was "very sloppy," and police rarely went to court. Af-
ter the ban, the prosecutorial demands for stronger cases necessitated
better investigations by the police.101
The statistical evidence supported the interview finding that the
new case screening was one of the most effective aspects of the plea
bargaining ban, particularly because it resulted in improved police
work. This was most evident in Anchorage and Fairbanks, where the
district attorneys' offices were large enough to permit one or a handful
97. Id. at 36.
98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at A-16 to A-17. The previous standard had been "probable cause." Id. at
1.
100. Id. at 32. Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau are the three largest communi-
ties in Alaska. For the original evaluation, data was collected only in those three
cities. For comparisons to the 1984-87 database, therefore, only data from the same
three cities was used. Even so, the 1984-87 data were not entirely comparable to the
earlier 1974-76 data because the 1980s database included cases that were referred to
the prosecutor prior to an arrest, while the 1970s database included only cases in
which an arrest had been confirmed. However, limiting the 1980s database to cases in
which an arrest was confirmed would not necessarily make the two databases more
comparable, because the 1980s cases probably benefited from greatly improved police
work, perhaps making them stronger than the earlier cases.
101. Id. at 37.
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of attorneys to screen most felonies. It was somewhat less applicable
to smaller offices where the combination of fewer attorneys and more
cases coming from villages gave the police more opportunity to exer-
cise their traditional prerogative of deciding the criminal charges. In
rural areas where weather, distance, and lack of transportation be-
tween villages often limited access to justice agencies, 10 2 few police
charges were screened prior to filing. Police and troopers continued to
file charges without consulting prosecutors because defendants had to
be arraigned within twenty-four hours of arrest.10 3 In such communi-
ties, prosecutorial review of the case occurred after arrest, and was
often postponed until after indictment.
1. Anchorage. Screening in Anchorage was dominated by the
head of the intake section, who had been screening cases since 1975.
He recalled that the intake practices prior to the ban were very infor-
mal, and that the most junior district attorney would usually be as-
signed to evaluate cases. The result was that most cases were filed and
later negotiated. 104 In a separate interview, the same attorney said
that a formal intake procedure was set up for screening cases immedi-
ately after the ban. He estimated that 30 to 40% of the cases referred
by the police in the first two years after the ban were rejected, but
added that the percentage was now lower. 0 5 A former chief of police
corroborated the informal nature of pre-ban screening of cases, noting
that many were handled by telephone. He also commented that after
the ban cases not only had to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt test,
but sometimes had to meet additional criteria, such as having an eye-
witness in a drug case. He believed that these additional criteria elimi-
nated many provable cases. 0 6
The term "screening" came to encompass all pre-indictment 0 7
activity in Anchorage, and to cover case discussions with defense at-
torneys as well as unilateral decisions about a case by the prosecu-
tor.108 Most persons interviewed, including prosecutors, agreed that
102. About 95% of Alaska's communities cannot be reached by road or railroad.
Access is only by airplane, snow machine or dog sled in the winter, or boats in the
summer. These communities include both major towns such as Barrow, Bethel,
Ketchikan, Kodiak, Kotzebue, Nome and Sitka, and over 200 smaller villages spread
throughout the state.
103. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(a); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(a) (1990).
104. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 41.
105. Id.; see also id. at 33 (Table 2) (showing the percentage of Anchorage cases
screened out was 28% in 1984 and 23% in 1987).
106. Id. at 41.
107. Defendants in Alaska have a constitutional right to indictment by a grand
jury. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8. In practice, this right is often waived and an infor-
mation is filed by the prosecutor.
108. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 42.
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in Anchorage, pre-indictment screening often involved charge bargain-
ing, despite the official prohibition of plea negotiations. 0 9 This charge
bargaining was defended as a necessary means of conserving system
resources, despite the fact that it had been established as an institution
at least since the early 1980s, well before the state began experiencing
revenue losses. 110 Screening in Anchorage was defined by the prosecu-
tors as including both the intake activities of the prosecutor's office
prior to filing charges and the prosecutors' review of cases during the
post-filing/pre-indictment period."1
2. Fairbanks. The Fairbanks district attorney's office screened
out more cases in both 1984 and in 1987 than any other in the state. It
was second only to the Bush office in 1985 and 1986.112 Public defense
attorneys in Fairbanks perceived a set screening policy and could iden-
tify the people responsible for screening various types of cases. Police
officers and private defense attorneys did not perceive as much organi-
zation. 113 One long-time police officer commented that when he
started work shortly before the ban took effect, cases were "plea bar-
gained on a wide open basis."'1 14 He added that immediately after the
ban there was more filing of multiple charges, but that many of the
extra charges were dismissed. The situation in 1988, in his view, was
quite fluid, with screening practices primarily dependent on the dis-
trict attorney's resources at any given time.115 An assistant district
attorney also emphasized the role of resources in screening. In addi-
tion, he applied other subjective criteria to his screening decisions,
such as whether it would be "worth the time and money to convict [a
particular] case."'1 16 The role of resources and such subjective criteria
was not as prominent for Anchorage attorneys. 117
Although Fairbanks screening practices adhered to the same
standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," fewer cases were ac-
cepted for prosecution than in Anchorage. 118 This suggests either
more rigorous consideration of cases or application of other screening
criteria, or both. It could also suggest that Fairbanks police did not
109. Id.
110. Id. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 45. Fairbanks screened out 40% of all cases in 1984 and 44% in 1987.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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prepare cases as well as in Anchorage. None of the interviewees, how-
ever, suggested this as a possibility.119 The fact that filed conviction
rates for Fairbanks were similar to those for Anchorage, despite the
much higher Fairbanks screening rate, suggests that other criteria,
such as available resources or "bother to the system," may have
played a larger part in Fairbanks screening.1 20
3. Other Locations. Between 1984 and 1987, Anchorage screened
out 23 to 28% of its cases, the lowest proportion of any community in
the state. Anchorage was closely followed by the Southeast Alaska
communities, including Juneau, Sitka and Ketchikan, which screened
out 24 to 29% of their cases. The Southcentral Alaska communities of
Kenai, Kodiak, Palmer and Valdez screened out cases at rates varying
from 28 to 36%. Fairbanks and the Bush communities declined the
highest number of cases for prosecution. Fairbanks screened out 40 to
44% of its cases, while the Bush screened out 36 to 43%.121
In places other than Anchorage and Fairbanks, prosecutors un-
derstood "screening" to mean the opportunity to review the charges
brought by :police and to decide what charge(s) to file. 122 Although
many prosecutors, even in the most rural areas, used the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard set by the attorney general's office for
screening, the standard often was not applied until after the case had
been filed in court. At times it was not applied until after indictment,
but this was still viewed as screening if the prosecutor felt this was the
first opportunity to assess the strength of the case, the need for prose-
cution and available resources.123
One of the attorney general's purposes in instituting the ban on
plea bargaining was to clarify roles within the criminal justice system.
He believed that police should investigate, prosecutors should charge
and convict, and judges should sentence. 124 The screening procedures
and standards represented one of the points at which the policy
changed existing practices and improved the quality of cases.
Although the screening policy was adopted to further the prohibition
of plea bargaining, it stands out as an example of a successful policy in
its own right.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 46.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 47-48.
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B. Charge Reductions and Dismissals
The Alaska Judicial Council's re-evaluation of the ban shows that
charge bargaining increased in the middle to late 1980s, 125 and
emerged as a significant influence on the disposition of cases. This
charge bargaining continues despite the attorney general's written pol-
icy prohibiting the reduction or dismissal of charges solely to obtain a
guilty plea.126 Thus, it appears that current practices in Alaska's dis-
trict attorney's offices are significantly out of step with the attorney
general's official policy.
Charge reductions and dismissals may be tangible evidence of
charge bargaining, or they may represent unilateral and legitimate de-
cisions by prosecutors to change the charge in response to new infor-
mation about the case. Attorney General Gross recognized the
difficulties of trying to distinguish between legitimate charge reduc-
tions or dismissals and those that violated the spirit of his policy. 127 In
retrospect, it was relatively easy to change the sentence bargaining
practices that had been the standard means of case disposition, be-
cause the sentence recommendation was an objectively verifiable ac-
tion by the prosecutor. Implementing rigorous screening standards
was more difficult, but was accomplished within a few years. 128
Prohibiting charge bargaining, however, appears to have been an
overly idealistic goal.
125. Id. at 54. Most prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges interviewed said
that charge bargaining occurred fairly routinely in most parts of the state. Id. at 61-
63. In general, this was perceived as a different situation than existed in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The percentage of pleas associated with reduced or dismissed
charges increased from 37% in 1984 to 48% in 1987. Id. at 62 (Table 8).
126. The current policy states:
Unless specifically approved by the Attorney General or the Chief Prosecu-
tor prior to the initiation of any negotiations, prosecuting attorneys will not
enter into any agreement or understanding with a defendant or his attorney
that is designed to lead to the entry of a plea of guilty.., that in any way
involves a concession with respect to the charge to be filed or which involves
an agreement to dismiss or reduce a charge, except as provided under sub-
section (2) below.
1980 STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 24. Subsection (2) permits the prosecutor, in
multiple count cases (excluding felony violent offenses) to communicate to the defend-
ant prior to the entry of a plea that counts may be dismissed if three conditions are
met: (1) the defendant must plead to the "essence" of the conduct charged; (2) the
information pertaining to the additional count or counts "may be fully related to the
court at sentencing;" and (3) the office supervisor approves any dismissals and decides
whether the dismissed counts are mentioned at sentencing. Id. at 24-25.
127. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 24-25. See also THE BAN
RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 48.
128. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 48-49.
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Immediately after the ban, charge bargaining appeared to decline
somewhat in most parts of the state.1 29 The exceptions were the rural
areas, where most attorneys viewed charge negotiations as essential to
the disposition of cases, and Fairbanks.130 In Fairbanks, charge re-
ductions and dismissals increased during the first year after the ban,
but dropped thereafter.131
The initial differences between Fairbanks and the rest of the state
may have been a result of a combination of the local legal culture and
the appointment of a new district attorney in February of 1975, whoimmediately instituted his own ban on plea bargaining, six months
before the statewide ban took effect. 132 His ban permitted the filing of
multiple charges, some of which could later be dismissed under appro-
priate circumstances. 133 After the attorney general's clarification of
the statewide policy in June of 1976, charge reductions and dismissals
dropped in Fairbanks.134 Figure 1 emphasizes the relatively low per-
centage of reductions and dismissals associated with guilty pleas in
Fairbanks as compared to Anchorage during the mid-1980s.
The charge bargaining policy evolved very differently in
Anchorage than in Fairbanks. In Anchorage, prosecutors emphasized
the importance of the pre-indictment hearing in the disposition of
cases. 135 Table 2 shows the timing of charge reductions by geographic
area. It is clear that the pre-indictment phase accounts for far more
charge reductions in Anchorage than elsewhere in the state.
The statistical analysis and interview data from the Council's
most recent study showed that charge reductions increased steadily
between 1984 and 1987, from 19% of all cases to the pre-ban level of
24% of all cases (Table 1). Dismissal of some charges associated with
129. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 27; see also THE BAN RE-
EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 49.
130. ALASKa BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 27.
131. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 65; see also infra Figure 1 (show-
ing that charge reductions and dismissals dropped substantially in Anchorage during
the first year after the ban, but increased noticeably in Fairbanks).
132. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 237.
133. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 49.
134. ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 235-36. In 1979 the Fair-
banks district attorney said, "We probably have more multiple-count cases than any
other part of the state. It's a strategy for going to trial. You're better off going to trial
with as many charges as possible. But at sentencing, it doesn't matter much. That
hasn't changed much since 1976." THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 49. In
a 1989 interview, the district attorney in Fairbanks confirmed that his interpretation
of the ban permitted the filing of multiple charges that could be dismissed later under
appropriate circumstances. He said, "Sentence bargaining is what the ban addressed.
Structured approval requirements for charge bargaining were included in the ban.
There has always been plea bargaining but it has been within the structured guidelines
of the Department of Law." Id. at 22.
135. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 70.
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FIGURE 1
Plea with One or More Reduced
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a plea to other charges also increased. In 1984, 1985 and 1986, about
18% of filed cases fit into this category; that percentage increased to
25% in 1987.136
TABLE 2
TIMING OF CHARGE REDUCTIONS WITH PLEA
(Percentage or Filed Cases, Except for Screening Phase)
Before Indictment & F
Screening Indictment I Before Final Fin
By Major Geographic Area
Statewide 1% 17% 7% 6%
Anchorage 1% 23% 4% 7%
Fairbanks 0% 5% 5% 4%
Southeast 3% 13% 10% 4%
Southcentral 0% 0% 7% 7%
Bush 0% 23% 16% 8%
Most attorneys in Alaska agreed that charge reductions and dis-
missals occurred more frequently in the late 1980s than in the 1970s
136. Id. at 54, 56 (Table 6).
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shortly after the ban was implemented.' 37 Many said that charge ne-
gotiations are used to dispose of the majority of their cases. 138 The
statistical data indicated that 55 to 60% of the convicted defendants in
the 1984-87 database pled guilty or nolo contendere, and had at least
one charge reduced or one or more charges against them dismissed.' 39
In the 1980s, charge reductions varied by duration of the case
disposition process, type of offense, amount of the reduction, and loca-
tion. 14° Fairbanks had the largest percentage of offenders convicted
on the original most serious charge. It also had the lowest percentage
of persons convicted of either lesser felonies or misdemeanors, and the
highest percentage convicted after trial.' 4 ' Barrow had the highest
percentage of tried cases, and moderate percentages of lesser felonies
and misdemeanors resulting in convictions. 142 In the smaller commu-
nities, except for Barrow, Kenai, Palmer and Sitka, only about one-
third of the convictions were based on pleas to the top charge. 43
The percentage of felonies reduced to misdemeanors in
Anchorage was one of the highest in Alaska; the percentage of reduc-
tions to lesser felonies was among the lowest.144 A relatively high per-
centage of Anchorage defendants were convicted after a trial, which
may corroborate the interview testimony that little negotiating oc-
curred in Anchorage after the pre-indictment process was
completed. 45
Charge reductions also varied by type of offense. Except for the
unclassified offense of first degree misconduct involving a controlled
substance, drug charges were seldom reduced, whereas assault charges
were frequently reduced. Unclassified and class A offenses, the most
serious crimes, were rarely reduced to misdemeanors, though such re-
ductions were common for other types of offenses. For example, of
those defendants charged with second degree assault, a class B offense,
and convicted of any offense, only 16% were convicted of the assault
charge, while 55.7% were convicted of misdemeanors. 46
137. Id. at 54.
138. Id. at 66, 67 (Table 9).
139. Id. at 69 (Table 10).
140. Id. at 77.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Of convicted Anchorage cases that started as felonies, 29% ended with
the single most serious charge for which a conviction was obtained being a misde-
meanor. Fourteen percent of convicted Anchorage cases ended in a lesser felony, and
45% ended with a plea to the original charge. Id.
145. Id. at 71-74.
146. Id. at C-1 to C-10 (Table C-1).
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While charge discussions might have occurred in many cases, ne-
gotiations resulted in measurable benefits to the defendant in about
half of the cases. 147 The clearest benefit came either from the reduc-
tion of a presumptive charge to a non-presumptive charge, or from a
felony to a misdemeanor. Dropping to a non-presumptive charge not
only meant that the defendant had a good chance of receiving a
shorter sentence, but also that the defendant would be eligible for dis-
cretionary parole.148 Reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor could
also provide a shorter sentence, but meant more importantly that any
future conviction on a felony charge would not trigger the presump-
tive sentencing statutes. 149 Some attorneys, particularly prosecutors,
perceived the primary benefits as flowing to the state through cost sav-
ings, rather than to the defendant. 150
Alaska communities did not exhibit unusual case disposition pat-
terns in comparison to other jurisdictions.1 51 Guilty or nolo con-
tendere pleas remained the overwhelming mode of disposition, 152 and
a sizable minority of defendants appeared to have entered pleas to the
original charges against them. 5 3 Although charge bargaining may
have seemed rampant to those within Alaska, it still affected only
about half of the filed and completed cases.154 Another 8.9% of the
convicted defendants had been convicted after trial, 155 leaving a full
41% of all convicted defendants who pled guilty or nolo contendere to
the original charges against them.
147. Id. at 69.
148. Id. at 60; see infra note 184.
149. See infra note 181.
150. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 60.
151. In 1986, 9% of Anchorage cases that were filed by the prosecutor and had
been completed at the time of the study went to trial; 15% of Fairbanks cases and 6%
of cases in Southeast Alaska were tried. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at
92 (Table 20). According to a report prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of
the United States Department of Justice, only Portland, Oregon had a comparable
rate at 12%. Philadelphia had the highest rate at 30%. Manhattan's rate was 3%,
San Diego's rate was 2%, and the trial rate in Washington, D.C., was 7%. B. Bo-
LAND, C. CONLY, L. WARNER, R. SONES & W. MARTIN, THE PROSECUTION OF
FELONY ARRESTS 1986, at 5 (1989) (Table 3). Another Bureau of Justice Statistics
report suggested that communities with high trial rates tended to have lower charge
reduction rates. B. BOLAND & B. FORST, THE PREVALENCE OF GUILTY PLEAS 3
(1986).
152. Id. at 92 (Table 20).
153. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 68, 69 (Table 10).
154. Id. at 62 (Table 8).
155. Id. at 103 (Table 25).
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C. Trials
The attorney general expected that his new policy would create
more trials; that was, in fact, one of his primary reasons for prohibit-
ing plea bargaining. 156 As Table 1 shows, the trial rate did increase in
the first year after the ban, from 7% of all cases to 10%.157 Other
Alaska Judicial Council studies found that the rate of trials increased
again in 1977, but levelled off by 1978.158 By 1980, the trial rate had
dropped considerably, 159 and by 1984 the rate had dropped back to
7% of all arrests or cases referred to the prosecutors as felonies. The
rate stayed at about that level through 1987.160 The increase in the
trial rate immediately after the ban may be attributable to the ban
itself. The gradual decline in the trial rate and its stability in the mid-
1980s suggest that the justice system adjusted to the ban and to subse-
quent changes in the criminal code and sentencing structure without
resorting to trials. Still, Alaska trial rates for filed and completed
cases in 1986 were higher than most other major jurisdictions in the
United States during that year.161 The continuing high trial rates were
related partially to the ban and partially to the current presumptive
sentencing laws.
The evidence, both statistical and interview, strongly supports the
conclusion that while trials did increase for the first two to three years
156. Mr. Gross said in an interview in 1978 that, "The major concern I had after I
was appointed Attorney General was the general level of performance of prosecutors'
offices. There were lots of lag times, the conviction rates were appalling, especially in
one office." ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 13-15. Other attor-
neys concurred that there were problems: "[I]n 1973 one of the top trial men in this
offie... didn't try a single case .... You can't tell me that every one of those cases
had evidentiary problems." Id. at 15.
157. Data from other Judicial Council studies show that the percentage of charges
(the unit of analysis in all of the Council studies conducted on cases filed between 1974
and 1981) convicted after trial rose from 8.5% in the year before the ban to 15.3% in
the first year after the ban. In the second year after the ban, the rate was 22.4%. In
1978, it was 21.8%, and in 1979, it was 21.2%. In 1980, it dropped to 15.8%. It is
likely that these changes in trial rates were at least partially related to the ban on plea
bargaining. The declines in 1979 and 1980 reflect the system's eventual adjustment to
the ban. The lower figure for 1980 is probably due to a combination of factors, includ-
ing the new standards for case disposition adopted by the Attorney General's office,
see supra note 28, the adoption of the new criminal code and presumptive sentencing.
See N. MAROULES & T. WHITE, supra note 32, at 15; ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980, at 56 (1982).
158. N. MAROULES & T. WHITE, supra note 32, at 15.
159. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980, at 56.
160. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 91.
161. Id. at 91, 93 (Table 21).
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after the ban, the increase was handled without adding significant re-
sources to the system. Although a backlog in civil cases was attrib-
uted to the ban at one point,162 no new judges were added specifically
because of the ban. However, resources allocated to the Alaska judi-
cial system did increase during the years after the ban. Between 1977
and 1980, the operating budgets for state judicial agencies typically
increased by 30 to 50%. Between 1980 and 1986, operating budgets
increased by another 67% for courts and public safety, and by as
much as 300% for corrections. 163 The increases, however, were ar-
guably related to population growth and substantially higher state rev-
enues from oil, rather than to policy changes. 164
One major issue related to trials was the persistent question of
whether sentences imposed after trial were harsher than those for de-
fendants who pled guilty or nolo contendere. The existence of a differ-
ential, or "tariff," related to post-trial sentences has been taken by
some as a form of implicit plea bargaining.1 65 A past Judicial Council
study has shown consistent evidence of trial/plea differentials in
sentences for certain types of offenses. 166 Most attorneys and judges
interviewed for the present study, however, said that even though a
defendant might receive a longer sentence after trial, there were no
trial differentials. Instead, they insisted, longer sentences were justi-
fied either by facts about the case that became known at trial or by the
offender's denial of his acts in the face of overwhelming evidence of
guilt. A judge suggested that it was the defendant's position at trial
rather than the act of going to trial itself that was considered in deter-
mining sentence length. 167 Other judges and attorneys believed that
defendants could receive shorter sentences after trial. An Anchorage
judge thought that a sympathetic jury could help the defendant's
cause.' 68 An Anchorage defense attorney, however, attributed the
benefit to the judge's opportunity to see the defendant as more
human.169
162. The Alaska Court System's Administrative Director, Arthur Snowden, said
resources had been diverted for the trying of criminal cases due to the increase in trials
related to the plea bargaining ban. He added: "It may take three or four months more
time to process civil cases." No Crisis in the Courts, Official Says, Anchorage Daily
News, May 22, 1978, at A2, col. 6.
163. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 99. Data was provided by indi-
vidual agencies.
164. Id. at 98-100.
165. Id. at 108; see McDonald, From Plea Negotiations to Coercive Justice, 13 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 385, 386 (1979).
166. N. MAROULES & T. WHITE, supra note 32, at 43-45.
167. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 108.
168. Id. at 116.
169. Id.
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Only two of the defendants interviewed for the study had actually
gone to trial. 170 Slightly more than half of the defendants interviewed,
however, thought they would have fared better had they gone to trial,
because they believed that trial would have produced more facts in
their favor.1 71 However, many defendants said that their attorneys
had advised them against going to trial. The primary reason given by
the attorneys, according to the defendants, was that the defendants
would be sentenced to longer terms if convicted at trial. 172
The statistical analysis of trial differentials 173 was separated into
consideration of the "in/out" decision ' 74 and the mean active sentence
length.175 Of the five offenses studied, only two 176 with enough trials
to test showed some evidence of trial differentials in the in/out deci-
sion. 177  This modest effect could have been merely an artifact of the
limited information available to include in the models. Sentence
lengths for convictions of third degree drug offenses and sexual assault
in the second degree showed some measurable variance in the multiple
regression analysis. Again, however, limited information was avail-
able for inclusion in the models. In short, there was no evidence of a
widespread trial differential, although differences for individual of-
fenses or defendants were shown. 178
170. Id. at 103. Twenty-nine defendants were interviewed. All were incarcerated.
Id. The difficulties of obtaining interviews with probationers made speaking with
them prohibitively expensive. The defendants had to be reasonably articulate, and to
have been sentenced within the past few years. No attempt was made to get a repre-
sentative sample because of the various difficulties involved.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 105.
173. Test analyses of groups of offenses tended to yield spurious results. Instead,
common specific offenses were used in the analysis. Logit analysis and multiple re-
gression were used to test the interaction of plea/trial decisions with the variables of
presumptive sentence status, number of prior felonies and number of convicted
charges. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 109.
174. The "in/out" decision is the judge's decision whether to sentence the offender
to some amount ofjail time as opposed to placing the offender directly on probation or
suspending all jail time imposed. Id. at 139.
175. "Mean active sentence length" is the net amount of time the offender was
sentenced to serve, meaning the total amount of jail time imposed less any suspended
time. Id.
176. The two offenses were theft in the second degree, a class C felony typically
involving theft of property valued between $500 and $25,000, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.46.130 (1989), and drugs in the third degree, a class B felony usually involving
the sale of cocaine, see id. § 11.71.030.
177. Neither of the logit models explained the variance in the in/out decision well,
however. The variance explained was 14% for theft in the second degree and 23% for
drugs in the third degree. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 110.
178. Id. at 114.
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IV. SENTENCING AND THE BAN
The sentencing hearing is in many ways the pivotal point of the
criminal justice system. Everything that precedes it is oriented toward
it; all that follows is structured by the decisions made at that time.
Although the attorney general insisted that it was his intent to return
sentencing to the judiciary, and not to affect it directly, the prohibition
of plea bargaining had profound consequences for sentencing practices
in Alaska. The ban, in turn, has been deeply affected by the 1978
adoption of the new criminal code and the presumptive sentencing
scheme. The new code and presumptive sentencing statute repre-
sented the societal and academic trends toward reconsidering the use-
fulness of rehabilitation theories and dealing with crime and criminals
more severely. 179
A. The Structure of Alaska's Presumptive Sentencing Law and the
Revised Criminal Code
The revision of the criminal code and the introduction of pre-
sumptive sentencing were the major policy changes that occurred after
the institution of the ban in 1975. Although the ban did result in
longer sentences for offenders, prohibiting plea bargaining did not halt
the impetus in the legislature and among the public for a new ap-
proach to sentencing. Presumptive sentencing was based on the
Twentieth Century Fund's recommendations for a "just deserts" sen-
tencing structure that allowed more judicial discretion than "flat time"
proposals, and more legislative structure than mandatory
minimums. 180
Alaska's presumptive sentencing statutes specify the exact sen-
tence to be imposed on the typical offender for serious first offenses
and for all repeat felony offenders. 181 The sentence can be adjusted
only by using statutory or non-statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors. 18 2 In cases where imposition of the presumptive sentence
would result in manifest injustice, the case can be referred to a three-
179. 1 A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, RESEARCH ON SEN-
TENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 62 (1983).
180. See generally A. DERSHOWiTZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT
OF THE TVENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING
(1976).
181. In general, presumptive sentencing applies to all offenders convicted of Class
A felonies, and to those Class B and C offenders who have been convicted of a prior
felony or who directed the illegal act toward public officers. ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.125(c)-(e) (1990). It also applies to the unclassified offenses of first degree
sexual assault and first degree sexual abuse of a minor, and in a limited number of
other circumstances. See id. § 12.55.125(i).
182. Id. § 12.55.155.
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judge panel for a decision on the sentence. 183 Discretionary parole is
not available for offenders sentenced presumptively.18 4
Presumptive sentencing directly affected only a minority of both
the convicted offenders studied 85 and all offenders sentenced in
Alaska courts.8 6 The Alaska Court of Appeals, however, has used
presumptive sentencing as a reference in deciding appropriate
sentences for non-presumptive offenses, thus indirectly extending the
influence of presumptive sentencing to all felony offenders.8 7
Alaska established its Criminal Code Revision Commission in
1975. At that time, Alaska's criminal code had not changed substan-
tially since the early territorial days, when federal decisionmakers had
adopted Oregon's statutes with few revisions. 88 The Commission fol-
lowed the Model Penal Code, which categorizes offenses by levels of
seriousness. It also redefined many offenses and broadened many of
the grounds fbr conviction on some offenses by liberalizing intent pro-
visions to include recklessness, thereby making convictions easier to
obtain. 8 9 Most of the Commission's recommendations were adopted
183. Id. § 12.55.165-175.
184. Offenders who are sentenced non-presumptively to no more that 180 days are
eligible for parole at the discretion of the parole board after serving one-quarter of
their sentence. ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.090(a) (1986); id. § 33.16.100(c) (1986 & Supp.
1990). Presumptively-sentenced defendants are eligible for parole only after serving
their entire sentence less "good time," id. § 33.16.090(b)-(c) (1986), of up to one-third
of the sentence. Id. § 33.20.010(a). If the actual sentence is longer than the presump-
tive term because of aggravating factors or consecutive sentences, discretionary parole
is available during the extended period of the sentence. Id. § 33.16.090(b).
185. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 126.
186. For example, 37% of all sentenced offenders incarcerated on November 5,
1986 had presumptive sentences. ALASKA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 1987 ANNUAL
REPORT 59.
187. The court of appeals has held that "[n]ormally, a first offender should receive
a more favorable sentence than the presumptive sentence for a second offender. It is
clear that this rule should be violated only in an exceptional case." Austin v. State,
627 P.2d 657, 657-58 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
For a complete discussion of appellate review of sentencing, and the court of
appeals' benchmarks and guidelines, see Di Pietro, The Development of Appellate Sen-
tencing Law in Alaska, 7 ALASKA L. Rv. 265 (1990). The article was prepared
under the same State Justice Institute grant that funded the remainder of this project.
188. Stem, supra note 10, at 4. The Commission also relied heavily on Oregon's
1973 revision of its criminal code in developing Alaska's new code, thus maintaining
the historical connections between the two codes. Alaska's Code Revision Commis-
sion also referred to the New York, Arizona, Michigan and Missouri codes, among
others. For a detailed history of the Criminal Code Revision Commission's work, see
ALASKA DEP'T OF LAw, CRIMINAL CODE MANUAL (1979).
189. The judicial members of the Code Revision Commission formally objected to
the structure of the revised code. The two judges stated, "The majority of the sub-
commission, in its proposed major revision of the Code, has proposed a maize [sic] of
different types and degrees of crime which will create a colossal bureaucracy in the
criminal justice system of the state . . . ." Letter from Ralph E. Moody, Presiding
[Vol. 8:27
PLEA BARGAINING BAN
by the legislature in 1978.190 The 1978 revisions did not address drug
offenses, which were recodified in 1982 into a structure consistent with
the earlier revised offenses. 191 In 1983, sexual offenses also were re-
codified, with most offenses reclassified and made subject to more se-
vere penalties. 192
Presumptive sentencing was of far greater interest to most attor-
neys and judges interviewed for this study than were the changes in
the criminal code. Attorneys in Alaska viewed the relatively broad
provisions of the code, in combination with presumptive sentencing, as
greatly increasing the power of the prosecutor. They did not agree,
however, upon how the new code and sentencing scheme interacted
with the plea bargaining ban. No consensus, even within individual
communities, could be ascertained about the changes wrought upon
the ban by the introduction of presumptive sentencing. 193
The difficulty in interpreting these changes may have resulted
from the fact that the introduction of presumptive sentencing coin-
cided with national trends toward increased emphasis on non-rehabili-
tative sentencing policies,194 increased openness about and prosecution
of sexual offenses, 195 and very substantial demographic and economic
changes within the state. 196 Any one of these changes alone could
have obscured the interpretation of the interaction of the ban and pre-
sumptive sentencing. Together, they complicated it to the point that it
would be virtually impossible to accurately determine any precise
relationships.
The role of Alaska's appellate courts in structuring sentencing
has also been critical. The court of appeals was established in 1980,
shortly after the new code took effect, with jurisdiction over criminal
cases. The supreme court retained a discretionary right of appeal.
The court of appeals, which, in addition to its merit appeal decisions,
had decided over 1,100 sentence appeals by 1989,197 has adopted the
Superior Court Judge, and Laurel J. Peterson, District Court Judge, to Representative
Terry Gardiner, Chairman of Code Revision Commission (Feb. 18, 1977). The judges
went on to predict that under the new code many criminals would escape conviction
and more hearings and trials would be required. Id.
190. The new criminal code completely rewrote Titles 11 and 12 of the Alaska
Statutes. See Stem, supra note 10.
191. Act effective Jan. 1, 1983, ch. 45, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1-55.
192. Act effective Oct. 17, 1983, ch. 78, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 1-5.
193. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 125-28.
194. Von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (1987).
195. Memorandum from Gretchen Keiser, Legislative Analyst, to Alaska House of
Representatives 3 (June 21, 1985) (available in the Alaska Judicial Council library).
196. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
197. Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
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role envisioned by the original proponents of appellate review of sen-
tencing. The court routinely reduces excessive sentences to conform
them to sentences given in comparable cases. It has also created an
extensive body of case law articulating appropriate sentencing princi-
ples,198 establishing benchmark terms for many types of offenses, and
promulgating standards for the extent to which sentences can be in-
creased in aggravated cases. In addition, the court of appeals has
moved to limit possible excesses in the presumptive sentencing scheme
by regulating the total aggregate terms that may be imposed for of-
fenders convicted of multiple counts of certain crimes. 199
B. Changes in Sentencing Patterns
Whatever the cause, sentence lengths increased substantially in
Alaska after the ban, and defendants' chances of being sentenced to
straight probation were substantially lessened. Tables 3 and 4 show
the changes in sentencing patterns for specific offenses over the past
fifteen years, clearly delineating the marked increase in the severity of
sentences for most offenses between the 1970s and 1980s. Comparison
of offenses from the 1970s with those after the 1980 change in the
criminal code must be made with caution because many of the offenses
are not precisely comparable. In a few instances, apparent changes in
sentencing patterns indicate a lack of comparability between the pre-
1980 criminal code and the revised code, rather than actual changes in
sentencing.
The likelihood of receiving a jail sentence2 °O increased for most
offenses immediately after the ban, and was even higher in the mid-
1980s than in the period from 1975 to 1976 for each major group of
offenses.20 1 Among individual offenses the likelihood of receiving jail
198. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam);
see also Di Pietro, supra note 187, at 281.
199. Id. at 294.
200. Virtually all jails in Alaska are run by the state Department of Corrections.
When a judge imposes a sentence of incarceration, the defendant is committed to the
custody of the Department of Corrections, which then classifies the offender and de-
termines the correctional facility to which he or she will be sent. ALASKA STAT.
§ 33.30.011 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
201. According to a recent Department of Justice study, Alaska's incarceration
rates appeared to be about the same or lower for most offenses than the average for
other state courts. For example, in 1986, 31% of Alaska felons convicted of first
degree burglary received a sentence with no incarceration, as did 37% of those con-
victed of second degree burglary. In other state courts, the average for no incarcera-
tion was 26%. However, average drug trafficking probation rates for other states were
36%, while Alaska's rate for third and fourth degree drug offenses (Classes B and C)
was 47%. Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 1986, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS BULLETIN 2 (Feb. 1989); THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 140
(Table 29).
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time varied, with some decreases and some increases. Overall, how-
ever, three-quarters of the 1984 offenders were sentenced to some jail
time. By 1987, the overall percentage of defendants incarcerated had
dropped to 69%, due primarily to a drop from 71% down to 57% in
the percentage of property offenders likely to go to jail (Table 3).
TABLE 3
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO JAIL ('IN/OUr DECISION)
BY OFFENSE FOR ANCHORAGE/FAIRBANKS/JUNEAU
8/14/75 8/14/76 1984 1985 1986 1987
Violent 62% 63% 79% 74% 84% 83%
Robbery I 80% 82% 97% 94% 100% 100%
Assault II & III 57% 50% 71% 68% 73% 87%
Property 48% 51% 71% 63% 59% 57%
Burglary I 46% 67% 66% 64% 69% 69%
Burglary II 36% 51% 65% 64% 63% 58%
Theft II 46% 48% 57% 54% 49% 46%
Crim. Mischief II [100%] [20%] 64% 65% 47% 47%
Forgery II 78% 63% 68% 68% 57% 47%
Sexual 61% 77% 86% 86% 81% 90%
Sex Assault I [75%] 92% 92% 87% [88%] 94%
Sex Abuse I [56%] [67%] 95% 100% 91% 100%
Sex Abuse II [0%] [100%] 84% 78% 80% 80%
Drugs 36% 48% 67% 59% 59% 69%
Drugs III & IV 38% 42% 60% 55% 53% 65%
ALLOFFENSES 51% 56% J75% 70% J68% [69%
Brackets [ ] indicate fewer than 10 cases.
Mean sentence lengths fluctuated more than the in/out decisions
between 1976 and 1984.202 Sentence lengths increased for all offenses
that carried first felony offender presumptive sentences. First degree
robbery rose from 56 months to 61 months. Sexual assault in the first
degree rose from 82 to 101 months, and sexual abuse in the first degree
rose from 18 to 86 months.20 3 Sentences also increased for all other
202. See Table 4. Some differences may be due to lack of comparability among
offenses, such as "robbery" under the old code, which included both armed robbery
and "strongarm robbery." These offenses are generally distinguished in the new code
as robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree. ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.500-510 (1989).
203. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 141. There were fewer than ten
cases in the 1975-76 group.
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:27
TABLE 4
MEAN ACTIVE SENTENCE LENGTH (IN MONTHS)
FOR SELECTED OFFENSES
FOR ANCHORAGE/FAIRBANKS/JUNEAU
8/14/75 8/14/76 1984 1985 1986 1987
Violent 17 15 23 25 30 19
Robbery 1 32 20 61 80 127 55
Assault II & Il 11 9 13 13 14 16
Property 5 4 10 10 10 10
Burglary 1 4 6 18 17 26 24
Burglary 11 2 6 14 10 13 11
Theft 11 4 3 9 10 7 8
Crim. Mischief II [51 [2] 14 13 5 12
Forgery 11 13 8 17 13 14 10
Sexual 31 50 54 54 50 71
Sex Assault I [57] 82 101 76 [69] 159
Sex Abuse I [27 [18] 86 111 89 81
Sex Abuse 11 [01 [18] 29 22 29 34
Drugs 5 17 18 14 12 13
Drugs III & IV 4 8 10 14 11 is
ALo NSES 13 I 171 29 26 31 27
Brackets [ I indicate fewer than 10 cases.
offenses, reflecting a general tendency toward higher sentences.204 The
total active time sentenced in 1974 was 7,377 months for 569 convic-
tions. The total in 1975 was 8,922 months for 534 convictions. 20 5
From 1984 through 1987, the average months of active time sentenced
was 24,856 months per year for an average 931 convictions per year.
The average active time per conviction in 1975 was 16.7 months; for
the 1984 to 1987 period, it was 26.7 months. While some of the in-
crease is due to the higher number of offenders, a substantial portion is
due to the higher sentences. 20 6
204. See THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at C-11 to C-18 (Tables C-2 to
C-7). The tables show the sentences for each specific type of offense convicted in the
1984-87 database. The misdemeanors included in the tables were the most serious
offenses convicted in cases where at least one original charge was a felony.
205. No accurate data are available on the actual amount of time served as com-
pared to actual time sentenced for the average offender. Parole guidelines determine
to some extent the amount of time served by offenders eligible for parole. ALASKA
STAT. § 33.16.090-100 (1986 & Supp. 1990). Good time provisions structure the
amount of time served by presumptively-sentenced offenders, and also allow reduc-
tions in the time served by other offenders. See id. § 33.20.010 (1986).
206. Attorney General Gross commented during the first evaluation of the ban:
"I'm inclined to believe that if we hadn't done a thing in terms of plea bargaining,
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C. Sentencing and Plea Negotiations
The higher sentences after the ban were typically imposed by the
judge in an open sentencing hearing20 7 with input from the
presentence report investigator, the defense attorney and the prosecu-
tor. Prior to the ban, the typical sentence would have been a negoti-
ated agreement between the prosecutor and defense attorney, ratified
by the judge in open court.20 8 After the ban, specific sentence agree-
ments disappeared except in a relatively small number of cases. Thus,
one of the first effects of the ban was the almost immediate realization
of the attorney general's intention of returning sentencing to judges.20 9
Despite the significant increase in charge bargaining during the
mid-1980s, the interviews did not indicate that sentence bargaining or
recommendations similarly increased. 210 The stability of the prohibi-
tion of sentence recommendations may have resulted from the ease
with which they could be monitored. In contrast, charge negotiations
were almost impossible to adequately supervise. The changes in the
criminal code and sentencing structure also made charge bargaining
far more important than it had been in the past. Under the new code,
the choice of charge was, within some broad limits, the choice of
sentence.
Prosecutors maintained a role at sentencing, offering information
to the judges about the defendants' characteristics, suggesting a range
of sentences or a cap, or mentioning dismissed charges or aggravating
factors. All of these functions were subject to discussion with the de-
fense, although the discussions often took place only after a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere had been entered. 211 One rural private de-
fense attorney described several types of sentencing agreements, in-
cluding a cap on the sentence requested by the prosecutor, a non-
sentencing would still be higher today. I think the sentences are a reflection of the
temper of the times." ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 2, at 13.
207. At an open sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and defendant are free to argue
the merits of a specific sentence before the judge. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra
note 2, at 154.
208. Id. at 153-54.
209. Id. at 155.
210. Id. at 156.
211. In a manual on criminal defense prepared for the Continuing Legal Education
program of the Alaska Bar Association, assistant public defender Susan Orlansky sug-
gested the following:
[t]ry to negotiate that the dismissed or reduced counts will not be considered
at sentencing. Try to stipulate to a version of the facts both sides will accept.
Get these concessions in writing or on the record.
The state and the defense may agree not to file or not to contest reasonably
debatable aggravators and mitigators. If that is part of the deal, make it
explicit.
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binding concurrence on sentence length between prosecutor and de-
fense attorney, an open sentencing hearing, and, least common, a bind-
ing sentence agreement under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e). 212
Judges, attorneys and defendants varied in their estimations of
how much and in what ways the typical defendant benefited from plea
negotiations. A judge in Southcentral Alaska believed that prosecu-
tors' sentence recommendations, whether binding under Alaska Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 or not, depended upon each prosecutor's
estimation of the judge's sentencing practices. He also thought that
defendants generally benefited less by their pleas than did the sys-
tem.21 3 A Southeast Alaska judge agreed and added that he believed
defendants benefited more by avoiding a trial.214 A Southeast prosecu-
tor suggested that defendants gained only peace of mind by thinking
that they knew in advance what the sentence would be.2 15
An analysis of the mean sentence length for typical offenses sug-
gested that charge reductions could be of great benefit to a defendant.
Charge reductions can benefit a defendant both in terms of the sen-
tence for the immediate offense and in terms of the record of convic-
tions to be considered in future sentencings. For example, the mean
sentence for assault in the first degree was 78.5 months. Because this
is a Class A offense, even first-time felony offenders are subject to a
presumptive sentence.216 If the charge was reduced to assault in the
second degree, for which the mean active sentence was 24.6 months,
the offender clearly received a substantial benefit. The reduction from
assault in the second degree to assault in the third degree, which had a
mean active sentence of 16.2 months, was less dramatic. The most
common reduction was from assault in the third degree to the misde-
meanor of assault in the fourth degree. Not only was the mean active
sentence for assault in the fourth degree only 3.6 months, but pre-
sumptive sentences do not apply to repeat misdemeanor offenders.
Orlansky, Presentencing Procedures, Particularly Challenges to Negative Information
in the Presentence Report, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCING PROCEDURES AND
ISSUES 12 (1989) (citations omitted).
212. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 157.
213. Id. at 160-61.
214. Id. at 161.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 162. The presumptive sentence for first felony offenders other than first
degree murderers is five years, or seven years if the victim was seriously harmed or a
firearm was used. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1990). Since first degree assault by
definition causes serious harm to the victim, id. § 11.41.200, the typical first felony
offender sentence would be seven years. Offenders sentenced presumptively are not
eligible for parole but may earn good time of up to one-third of the sentence. See
supra note 184.
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Most importantly, if the defendant was convicted of a subsequent fel-
ony, the misdemeanor conviction did not affect his or her status as a
first felony offender.217
Plea bargaining for time served was found primarily in
Anchorage. An Anchorage judge described the system:
The technique for sentence negotiations at the DA's office for a de-
fendant charged with a felony can be setting the defendant's case
aside for 30 to 90 days while the defendant stays in jail. After an
agreed-upon time has elapsed, then the case is reduced to a misde-
meanor. The defense makes a recommendation [to the judge] to
time served and the state does not object.218
Defense attorneys commented that "[t]he DA will reduce to a misde-
meanor but won't take the action until the defendant has done time up
front. This is done in less serious cases." 219 The practice emphasizes
the ability of the prosecutor in this situation to determine the defend-
ant's sentence even more directly than by adjusting the level or
number of charges.
Various commentators have suggested that structured sentencing
systems comparable to Alaska's presumptive sentencing scheme would
encourage charge bargaining. In Minnesota, for example, charge bar-
gaining appeared to increase for some offenses after the introduction of
sentencing guidelines.220 In Omaha, Nebraska, where third-offense
drunk driving is a felony, 42% of the third-offense charges filed were
plea bargained down to second-offense charges.221
Evidence from Alaska suggests that the percentage of charge re-
ductions rose after the 1982-83 amendments increased the severity of
presumptive sentences for some offenses and greatly expanded the
number of defendants to whom presumptive sentencing would ap-
ply.222 The patterns of charge reductions, however, do not clearly
support a hypothesis that the increase in charge reductions was a di-
rect result of the changes in presumptive sentencing. For example, the
217. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 162.
218. Id. at 163.
219. Id.
220. Cohen & Tonry, supra note 8, at 426. Cohen and Tonry cited the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission report, which showed that the proportion of
charge reductions increased for cases with low criminal history scores. Fewer cases
were actually convicted of aggravated robbery. There were apparently adjustments in
case processing to avoid imposing the prescribed prison term for marginally serious
defendants when prison was not deemed appropriate in every case by court personnel.
With high criminal history scores, however, the proportion of charge reductions de-
clined. Id.
221. S. WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME 110 (2d ed. 1989).
222. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 166.
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definitions of sexual offenses were drastically revised in 1983, and pen-
alties were increased for most sexual offenses. The rates of charge re-
ductions for sexual offenses did not increase after 1984; they dropped
in 1985 from 31% to 27%, increased in 1986 to 33%, and increased
again in 1987 to 35%.223 The differences are not substantial in either
direction, and do not suggest that the changes in either the code or the
sentences played a role. The charge reduction rates for robbery in the
first degree, which became subject to a five-year presumptive sentence
for first felony offenders in 1983, also declined, from 31% in 1984 to
6% in 1985. Then they increased sharply, rising to 28% in 1986 and
46% in 1987.224
Although some attorneys thought that the increasing amount of
charge bargaining after 1985 was related to the requirement of pre-
sumptive sentences for first felony offenders, it is likely that other fac-
tors were more important. Chief among these factors were personnel
changes in the attorney general's office225 and the budget constraints
related to declining state revenues because of the drop in world oil
prices.2
26
The relationship between presumptive sentencing and the ban on
plea bargaining is complicated by the striking demographic and eco-
nomic changes taking place in Alaska throughout the 1980s. The
state's revenues, in 1979 dollars, tripled by 1982, from $1.5 billion to
$4.5 billion, due to a combination of increased oil production at
Prudhoe Bay and a tripling of world oil prices.227 In 1986, the state's
economy plummeted, due to falling world oil prices, but began to re-
cover in 1988 and 1989.228 Between 1979 and 1986, the state's popula-
tion increased over 30% to approximately 542,000,229 then dropped,
but began increasing again in 1988 and 1989.230 Some of the problems
in the state's justice system that were commonly attributed to the plea
bargaining ban, presumptive sentencing, or both, were often better ex-
plained by reference to increases and decreases in the state's revenues,
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. In mid-1985, Norman Gorsuch resigned as attorney general and was suc-
ceeded by Harold M. Brown. Mr. Brown later commented that he "was not person-
ally a great believer in 'the ban.'" Also in mid-1985, Dan Hickey, who had been the
chief prosecutor since the ban in 1975 and had been largely responsible for enforcing
the ban, returned to private practice. Id. at 31.
226. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
227. Leask, Foster & Gorsuch, Where Have All the Billions Gone?, in ALASKA
REV. OF SOC. AND ECON. CONDITIONS 4-5 (1987).
228. Boucher, Fried, Rae & Stinson, 1989: Economic Revival Plus an Oil Spill
Boom, ALASKA ECON. TRENDS 3 (April 1990) (Figure 1).
229. Leask, Foster & Gorsuch, supra note 227, at 19.
230. ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW: 1988 AND PROVISIONAL 1989 EsTI-
MATES 14 (1990).
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or to the dramatically increased numbers of convictions resulting from
increased enforcement efforts in the early 1980s. 231 Many attorneys
believed that presumptive sentencing encouraged or forced charge bar-
gaining, particularly for first offenders, but the statistical evidence did
not provide any strong support for that hypothesis.
V. SUMMARY
The re-evaluation of the plea-bargaining ban found major differ-
ences between practices in Alaska before the ban and current practices
that could be directly attributed to the ban. First, screening cases was
dramatically increased, with consequent improvements in case quality.
Second, routine sentence recommendations for specific terms were vir-
tually eliminated soon after the ban and have not returned. As a re-
sult, most defendants are sentenced by the judge at an open hearing
with participation by the prosecutor, defense attorney and pre-sen-
tence reporter.
A third major finding was that charge bargaining was substan-
tially curtailed for some years, but has become steadily more prevalent
since the mid-1980s. A combination of circumstances appears respon-
sible, including personnel changes in the attorney general's office and
local district attorneys' offices, changes in the criminal code structure
and the reduction of resources available for the prosecution of cases
after mid-1986.
The data clearly show that sentences increased substantially in
length in the years after the ban, and that the likelihood of a jail sen-
tence increased for most offenders. Society's increased concern with
crime and willingness to allocate significant resources to law enforce-
ment, courts and corrections, however, were probably at least equally
responsible for the longer sentences and larger jail populations as were
the ban or presumptive sentencing alone.
Finally, appellate review of sentencing by the Alaska Court of
Appeals and the Alaska Supreme Court has resulted in comprehensive
case law guidelines for most offenses and benchmark sentences for sev-
eral types and groups of offenses. The courts have extended the princi-
ples of the presumptive sentencing structure to all non-presumptive
sentences in an effort to carry out the legislative mandate for greater
fairness and uniformity in sentencing.
231. The analysis shows that neither increased population (up by 30%), nor higher
crime rates (reported crime increased by 16% between 1980 and 1984) explain the
100% increase in the number of convicted offenders between 1980 and 1984. Crimi-
nal justice agency operating budget increases appear to be more closely related to the
increase in convictions. See F. BREMSON & T. CARNS, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES:
1984, at 54-61 (1987).
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VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Alaska Judicial Council makes the following recommenda-
tions based on its findings from the re-evaluation of the ban on plea
bargaining:
A. Screening
The Judicial Council recommends that the present high standards
for screening be maintained.
According to most persons interviewed, the present screening
policy is both a positive influence on the quality of cases and a useful
tool for prosecutors. If extra time is needed for screening cases in
some situations, especially in rural areas, that need should be formally
recognized in the written policy guidelines.
B. Charge :Bargaining
The Judicial Council recommends that the Attorney General clar-
ify the current policy on charge bargaining.
Despite the attorney general's written policy prohibiting charge
bargaining, most prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges inter-
viewed said that charge bargaining occurred fairly routinely in most
parts of the state. In general, they perceived this as a different situa-
tion than existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The statistical
evidence also supported the hypothesis that charge bargaining in-
creased substantially in the mid- to late-1980s.
The Alaska Judicial Council takes no position with respect to the
practice of charge bargaining. The attorney general may wish either
to reiterate the present written policy and encourage its application in
practice, or to incorporate the existing practices into his policy. In
either case, the written policy and actual practice should be consistent
to avoid confusion among the legal community and the public.
C. Sentencing
Some aspects of presumptive sentencing should be reconsidered.
The legal community does not appear to have achieved a consen-
sus about the merits of presumptive sentencing. Attorneys, judges, po-
lice officers and probation officers interviewed over the past two years
expressed some satisfaction with the greater uniformity of sentences,
but many were concerned that the length of presumptive sentences for
some first felony offenders was too great, or that presumptive sentenc-
ing was too inflexible for first offenders' situations. 232 Little concern
was expressed about presumptive sentences for repeat offenders; most
232. THE BAN RE-EVALUATED, supra note 2, at 4.
[Vol. 8:27
PLEA BARGAINING BAN
of those interviewed seemed to believe that presumptive sentences
were generally appropriate for them.
Presumptive sentencing influences the entire criminal justice sys-
tem, from the arrest and charging decisions made by prosecutors to
the numbers of offenders going to trial and being sentenced to over-
crowded prisons. Although the ideas underlying presumptive sentenc-
ing are still useful, re-thinking the implementation of those ideas could
be helpful. In the original presumptive sentencing proposals made by
Professor Alan Dershowitz, for example, sentences were tied to nar-
rowly-defined offenses. When presumptive sentencing was adopted in
Alaska, it was combined with a criminal code in which the emphasis
was on broader definitions of offenses. Sentences were imposed based
on a system that classified all offenses into six general groups. Pre-
sumptive sentencing in Alaska might better meet the needs of practi-
tioners and legislators if sentences were more closely tied to specific
offenses.
Other proposals that have been made for altering presumptive
sentencing include expanding it to cover all first felony offenders and
all misdemeanor offenders, shortening the lengths of some terms, in-
creasing others and providing discretionary parole. The Judicial
Council does not take a position on any specific proposal. Rather,
based on the interviews and information compiled in the course of the
past ten years, the Council recommends that the legislature, through
the Alaska Sentencing Commission, carefully review presumptive sen-
tencing and its interactions with other statutes and case law, as well as
its effects on the criminal justice system.
The Judicial Council recommends that the legislature establish
procedures to thoroughly evaluate existing and proposed sentencing pro-
visions to compare the relative seriousness of offenses, and carefully con-
sider the full range of costs associated with new sentencing proposals.
This process should begin immediately, before Alaska develops the virtu-
ally unsolvable prison overcrowding problems found in so many other
states.
While the comparative contributions of presumptive sentencing,
the plea bargaining ban and the changes in public attitudes in favor of
tougher sentences are not necessarily clear, it is apparent that some
combination of these factors, together witl population and resource
increases, have led to longer sentences overall and a much larger
prison population. Alaska ranked fourth among the states in 1987 in
the percentage of its population that it incarcerated. 233
In spite of Alaska's relatively large prison population, prison
overcrowding is much less of a problem in Alaska than in many other
233. Austin & Brown, Ranking the Nation's Most Punitive and Costly States, in
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQ., Focus 2 (1989).
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states. Abundant state resources, especially before 1986, allowed
Alaska the flexibility to increase funding for its criminal justice agen-
cies. Those substantial state resources are likely to decline, however,
both as a result of decreasing oil production and public pressure for
reduced government spending.
Alaska is not the only state that has adopted determinate sentenc-
ing laws that emphasize substantial prison terms. To the extent that
the plea bargaining ban still exists in Alaska, however, prosecutors are
constrained in taking economic realities into account in sentencing.
The chance of receiving a reduced sentence in exchange for a plea in
Alaska is substantially less than in most other states. It is likely that
one reason for the increase in charge bargaining in Alaska is the per-
ception of the actors in the criminal justice system that system re-
sources are becoming more scarce.
This is not to say that plea bargaining, either in the form of sen-
tence or charge bargaining, should be encouraged. Plea bargaining, to
the extent it allows the system to conserve scarce resources, does so
only by overiding the legislative intent that particular conduct consti-
tutes a crime that should be sanctioned in a particular way. The costs
of banning this mechanism have not been as great as anticipated, and
the benefits to the criminal justice system have been substantial.
The consequence of Alaska's tough sentencing laws in the face of
limited state resources will inevitably intensify pressure on the system
to allow for more plea bargaining and make other systemic changes to
allow the continued functioning of the criminal justice system. If the
legislature structures its criminal code and sentencing provisions to
incarcerate felons to a greater extent than it can pay for, the conse-
quence can only be a deterioration in other aspects of the criminal
justice system.
The Alaska Legislature has already taken the first step in this re-
gard by establishing the Alaska Sentencing Commission. 234 The Com-
mission is charged with considering the seriousness of each offense in
relation to other offenses,235 alternatives to traditional forms of incar-
ceration, and the projected financial effect of changes in sentencing
laws and practices. 236 This Commission has the potential to solve
many problems in Alaska's sentencing structure before the structure
becomes unmanageable.
234. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.561-577 (1990).
235. I-d. § 44.19.571(2)(A).
236. Id. § 44.19.569(3), (8).
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D. Current Case Law on Sentencing
The Judicial Council recommends that the legislature, through the
Alaska Sentencing Commission, examine the benchmarks established
by the state's appellate courts to guide the discretion ofjudges.
The legislature and the Sentencing Commission should examine
the various benchmarks set by the courts to determine whether there is
sentencing law in those decisions that would be more effectively ad-
dressed by statutes, and whether the benchmarks and sentencing crite-
ria could be summarized in a way that would make them easily
accessible to judges, attorneys and the public. The Alaska Supreme
Court and Alaska Court of Appeals have established many
benchmarks and criteria to guide the discretion of sentencing judges.
The appellate courts' decisions have been extremely helpful in struc-
turing sentencing activity in the trial courts. Because the decisions
have not been compiled in one place, however, it is not always easy to
find the current law on sentencing of a particular offense. Summariz-
ing the case law related to sentencing, and possibly codifying portions
of it, would have two primary benefits. Codification would permit fac-
tors inappropriately considered by an appellate court, such as the
state's resources, to be taken into account in setting benchmarks and
guidelines. The process also would encourage input from agencies and
persons affected by sentencing decisions, thus increasing the opportu-
nities for accountability.
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